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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME 1976 NUMBER I
SYMPOSIUM
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
RIGHT TO KNOW
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW*
THOMAS . EMERSON**
Recent events have brought to our attention, once again, the vital
importance in a democratic society of the right to know. James
Madison long ago stated the elementary facts:
A popular government, without popular information or the means
of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power
knowledge gives.'
His proposition has never been more true than it is today, in a world
of expanding social controls, lessening moral constraints, and unfore-
seen possibilities for mutual destruction. The question to which I
address myself is whether the right to know can be effectively incor-
porated into our legal structure, through development of an adequate
constitutional theory and workable operating rules.2
* This paper was delivered as the Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture at
Washington University Law School on March 3, 1976.
** Lines Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B., 1928; LL.B., 1931, Yale.
1. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 WRriNGS
OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed. 1910).
2. Prior material dealing with this subject includes J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THR
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It is clear at the outset that the right to know fits readily into the
first amendment and the whole system of freedom of expression.
Reduced to its simplest terms the concept includes two closely related
features: First, the right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise
receive communications; and second, the right to obtain information as
a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others. Together these consti-
tute the reverse side of the coin from the right to communicate. But
the coin is one piece, namely the system of freedom of expression.
Moreover, the right to know serves much the same function in our
society as the right to communicate. It is essential to personal self-
fulfillment. It is a significant method for seeking the truth, or at least
for seeking the better answer. It is necessary for collective decision-
making in a democratic society. And it is vital as a mechanism for
effectuating social change without resort to violence or undue coercion.
Likewise there are many advantages to recognizing the right to know
as a legal right independent of, or perhaps supplemental to, the more
traditional right of the speaker to communicate. The interests of the
listener may not always coincide with the interests of the communicator.
The communicator may not always be in a position to assert his rights.
The admitted interests of the recipients will be entitled to greater
weight when they are based upon an independent legal foundation,
rather than being merely derivative of rights of the communicator.
Additionally, the right to know focuses on the affirmative aspects of the
first amendment and the system of freedom of expression, as well as
simply looking at the negative right to be free of government interfer-
ences.
For these and other reasons, we ought to consider the right to know
as an integral part of the system of freedom of expression, embodied
in the first amendment and entitled to support by legislation or other
affirmative government action. There has been some dissent from this
PREss FOR WHOM? (1973); Klein, Towards an Extension of the First Amendment: A
Right of Acquisition, 20 U. MAMI L REV. 114 (1965); Parks, The Open Government
Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1957); Steel, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justification of the First Amend-
ment, 46 WAsm L. REv. 311 (1971); Note, The Rights *bf the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, Access to Official Inforina-
tion: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952); Note, Access to Gov-
ernment Information and the Classification Process--Is There a Right to Know?, 17
N.Y.L.F. 814 (1971); Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 STAN.
L. Rav. 863 (1970).
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proposition, at least as to the constitutional status of the right to
know.3 But the argument for starting from this point seems to me
overwhelming.
The Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions, recognized a
constitutional right to know. The first clear expression of the doctrine
came in Lamont v. Postmaster General, decided in 1965, in which the
Supreme Court upheld the right of citizens to receive "foreign com-
munist propaganda" from abroad without having to notify government
authorities that they wished such mail to be delivered to them.4 Later,
in Stanley v. Georgia, a 1969 decision upholding the right of a person
to read or see pornography in the privacy of the home, the Court said
flatly: "It is now well established that the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas."5  Again the same year in the
Red Lion case, affirming the validity of the fairness doctrine in broad-
casting, the Court declared: "It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. '
Likewise Congress, notably in the Freedom of Information Act, and
many states in their sunshine laws, have provided legislative guarantees
for the right to obtain information from government.
Nevertheless, the contours of the right to know remain obscure.
The Supreme Court has sometimes ignored, or failed to give weight
to the guarantee. Examples of this are its decisions in Zemel v. Rusk,
'upholding blanket restrictions on the right of American citizens to travel
to Cuba;7 and in Kleindienst v. Mandel, refusing to accord any weight
to the right of American citizens to hear a foreign lecturer who has been
denied a visa." Nor has the legislature been fully successful in articu-
lating specific rules regarding government secrecy or the right of access
to government information. There is thus serious need for the
3. See, e.g., Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of
the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 271 (1971).
4. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
5. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
6. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also
statements in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 832 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The position was recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in a case decided shortly after this lecture was delivered, Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817
(1976).
7. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
8. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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development of a comprehensive theory of the right to know that will
give legal content to the concept and reconcile its requirements with
the demands of other interests.
It has been suggested that the right to know be adopted as the sole,
or at least the principal, basis for the constitutional protection afforded
by the first amendment. Alexander Meildejohn is the primary source
of this theory. He took the position that the right of the citizen to
receive and obtain information, in his capacity as sovereign master over
the public servants who compose the government, is the exclusive justi-
fication for according all persons freedom of speech and other first
amendment rights. In so far as a communication contributes to the
public's right to know, in his view, it is entitled to absolute protection
under the first amendment. But other forms of communication can be
restricted by government, subject only to due process, equal protection,
or similar constitutional guarantees. This theory thus makes the
right to know the sole touchstone in the interpretation of the first
amendmentY
In my view the Meiklejohn approach is not acceptable. In the first
place, it neglects the function of the first amendment in protecting the
right of the speaker to personal self-fulfillment. The potential of the
first amendment in this respect is daily becoming more important as
our society moves further and further toward conformity and deper-
sonalization. In the second place, while it is entirely feasible as a con-
stitutional matter to give full protection to speech, as distinguished from
action, it is impossible to give absolute constitutional protection to the
right to obtain information under all circumstances. Emphasis on the
right to know, as distinct from the right of communication, will there-
fore yield less protection in the end to freedom of expression. Third,
the dynamics of the system of freedom of expression rest on the asser-
tion of individual rights by the person desiring to communicate, far
more than on pressure from individuals desiring to listen. It is the
speaker who is more directly affected, is more highly motivated to
secure his right, will press harder to achieve it, and may have more
power to succeed. To focus on the more indirect and diffuse rights
9. A. MEmLEJOnN, POLrnCAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245. See Bloustein, The First Amendment and
Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philospher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1974);
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Steel, supra note 2. See also Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971).
[Vol. 1976:1I
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss1/6
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
of the listener would likewise tend to weaken the system. Finally,
history, tradition, doctrine, and practice have all developed largely on
the basis of protecting the rights of the speaker. A change of direc-
tion would seem to come too late in the game.
The Meiklejohn thesis rests largely upon his favorite analogy to a
town meeting. The essential point about a town meeting, Meiklejohn
argued, is not that everyone present be allowed to talk, or to talk as
much as he wants, but that everything relevant to the issue worth say-
ing be said (and heard). The analogy seems to me to be inadequate.
The town meeting is not the equivalent of a system of freedom of
expression, but a limited forum in which the moderator (the govern-
ment) must allocate scarce facilities among those desiring to speak, and
where what the speakers say must be germane to the agenda. More-
over, this process of moderating, as visualized by Meiklejohn, injects
the government into decisions on the content, political relevance, and
worth of the speech, an area that is no business of government in a free
system.
If we do not make the right to know the main basis for the system
of freedom of expression, then what should be the role of that doctrine?
There seem to be three general areas in which the right to know may
be of special importance. One is the use of the doctrine against direct
government interference with the system of freedom of expression. A
second is its use in situations where the government seeks to regulate
or expand the system by some form of affirmative action. And the third
is its use in making information available from government or private
sources. In addition, the right to know is subject to certain limitations
when the right may confront other interests that deserve protection.
It is impossible to discuss all aspects of these problems in detail here.
But an outline of the issues can be attempted.
The Right to Know as a Defense Against
Government Interference with the
System of Freedom of Expression
In general, protection against government interference with the
system of freedom of expression can be effectively maintained by
securing the rights of the speaker. Of course, the value of the com-
munication to the recipient is an important factor defining and support-
ing the right of the communicator. Moreover, under a balancing test
of the first amendment, the interest of the recipient would be given
Vol. 1976: 1]
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significant weight in striking the balance. The right to know, however,
ordinarily plays a secondary role in the legal handling of these
problems.
Nevertheless, there are some circumstances where it is necessary or
valuable to carry the analysis. beyond this point and to focus directly
on the rights of the recipient. In such situations the right to
know should receive direct constitutional protection under the first
amendment.
One of these situations occurs when the government attempts to con-
trol expression by applying a sanction directly against the recipient, in
lieu of or in addition to one against the communicator. Such a case
is Lamont v. Postmaster General, already mentioned, where the impact
of the government action fell squarely on the person seeking to receive
communications from abroad. Another example is the Stanley case,
also noted previously, in which mere possession of pornographic mater-
ials was made a criminal offense.
With respect to such situations it is possible, I believe, to lay down
a firm and simple rule: The right to know should be fully, or abso-
lutely if you prefer, protected. Other first amendment doctrines,
including the incitement, clear-and-present-danger, and balancing tests,
seem clearly unacceptable. The reasons for adopting this strict prin-
ciple are similar to those which afford absolute protection to freedom
of belief. The right to read, listen, or see is so elemental, so close to
the source of all freedom, that one can hardly conceive of a system of
free expression that does not extend it full protection. Moreover, any
danger to the social order at this point is so inchoate and so unascer-
tainable that it cannot be given substance or taken into account. On
the other hand, the injury to the system of free expression from
restricting such conduct is so gross that only a totalitarian system could
contemplate it.
Fortunately, imposition of direct sanctions upon the conduct of
receiving a communication is infrequent in our society. But it is not
inconceivable that a government would attempt to control expression
by such methods. An official secrets act, imposing criminal penalties
upon the mere receipt of classified information, has been urged.
Under our loyalty programs mere attendance at a meeting or receipt of
a magazine have constituted evidence of ineligibility to obtain a govern-
ment job. And laws making mere possession of "subversive literature"
an offense are not, under conditions of hysteria, beyond the realm of
[Vol. 1976:1
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possibility. All such infringements upon the right to know should be
unequivocally rejected as clearcut violations of the first amendment.
A second situation where it may be useful to rely upon the right to
know for protection against government interference occurs when the
speaker is not in a position to assert his rights. This happened in
Lamont, where the persons communicating the information were in a
foreign country, without access to our courts. It also happened in
Mandel, since the alien seeking admission had only limited rights under
the American Constitution. There may likewise be occasions when the
speaker does have standing but fails to take action to vindicate his
interests. Thus an exhibitor may fail to challenge censorship of a play
or a film, or a publisher may elect not to distribute materials in the
face of a threatened obscenity prosecution. Another instance of this
occurred recently in the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case, where
the court struck down a state statute banning price advertisements by
pharmacists, not on complaint of the pharmacists, but at the behest of
an individual consumer and two consumer organizations.'"
In these situations the Supreme Court has normally recognized the
right of the recipients to seek direct vindication of their right to know.
This should be the accepted rule. Indeed, even when the communica-
tor has standing and undertakes to defend his rights, a person attempt-
ing to protect the right to know should also be entitled to raise the issue
on his own. Such cases would presumably not arise often, and the
issues would usually be the same. But the recipient should be allowed
to present his position.
A third use of the right to know as protection against government
interference with the system of freedom of expression arises in certain
situations when the government itself engages in expression. The gov-
ernment of course is entitled to participate in the system of freedom
of expression and, while its contribution may at times tend to drown
out others, no constitutional objection can normally be entered. Under
some circumstances, however, the government may possess a monop-
oly, or a near monopoly, of the means of communication. Here restric-
tions on the government are necessary to prevent a serious distortion
of the system. For this difficult task, a limiting principle may be found
in the right to know.
10. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
Vol. 1976:1]
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For example, in the field of education, where the government has
a virtual monopoly, certain kinds of curriculum restrictions seem to run
afoul of the right to know. Thus in Epperson v. Arkansas, the
Supreme Court considered an Arkansas statute which prohibited teach-
ing the doctrine of evolution in the public schools. A majority of the
Court found that the law violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment, but the Court might better have placed its decision upon
a violation of the right to know. 1 Similarly in the area of public broad-
casting, the right to know would seem to compel the public broadcaster
to present a reasonably balanced view on issues of public interest. The
Supreme Court has not thus far employed right to know doctrines in
this way, but the concepts are applicable and should be utilized.
Use of the Right to Know in Formulating Affirmative
Government Controls Designed to Regulate
or Expand the System of Freedom of Expression
A major current problem in maintaining our system of freedom of
expression is that various economic and technical factors tend to distort
the system. Like most laissez-faire arrangements, the free market of
ideas does not work perfectly. Consequently, it is necessary for the
government to step in at times in order to regulate or expand the sys-
tem. Such action is frequently taken in the name of the right to know.
Government intervention of this sort is often necessary and proper.
Yet inevitably it poses a delicate question. There is an alarming para-
dox in employing government power to support or improve what must
ultimately remain a laissez-faire system. One must therefore weigh
carefully the role of the right to know and the extent to which its prin-
ciples justify governmental action.
The one crucial area in which the right to know should play a
decisive and directing part is that of government allocation of scarce
physical facilities among those desiring to use them. Shortages of com-
munication facilities are not infrequent. Two television stations cannot
broadcast on the same wavelength in the same locality; two organiza-
tions cannot march down Fifth Avenue at the same time. Without
government allocation of facilities the system would become chaotic.
The first amendment does not foreclose government action to deal
with the problem. Official intervention may take the form of legisla-
11. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
[Vol. 1976:1
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tive, executive, or judicial power. But the first amendment does not
disappear from the scene. Its mandate must be invoked to impose
limits on the government and to reconcile the competing interests of
those desiring to communicate. Under such circumstances the guiding
principles are found in the right to know.
The most significant, and most sensitive, problem in this area
concerns regulation of radio and television broadcasting. Despite argu-
a ent to the contrary, it seems clear that under present technological
conditions there is a shortage of physical facilities for broadcasting,
namely wavelengths. It is not possible for all those capable of obtain-
ing the physical equipment to broadcast. The fact that there are more
radio and television stations than daily newspapers is not controlling.
The appropriate comparison is not with newspapers but with printing
presses, or even Xerox machines. In any event, this shortage of physi-
cal facilities is the only justification for government licensing of stations,
or indeed for any regulation of broadcasting. Without that factor the
first amendment would demand that, despite the economic concentra-
tion, the government keep hands off broadcasting, just as it must keep
its hands off the press.
Since the government must allocate, however, it must do so according
to some standards. A first-come-first-served test, allowing a permanent
monopoly, would not make sense. The standards must be formulated
primarily, perhaps exclusively, according to principles embodied in the
concept of the right to know.
There are, of course, many difficult questions. In the first place,
it is not even clear whose right to know is involved. Does the right
to know belong to the individual in his own right? Or does its posses-
sion attach only to groups? If so, what groups are entitled to have their
interests recognized? The answers are not subject to easy formulation.
Yet basically, the genius of the American system of freedom of expres-
sion, as well as the practicalities of the situation, seem to call for prin-
ciples which locate the right to know in various social groupings-
economic, cultural, religious, and the like. These would be
overlapping, and perhaps shifting from time to time, but it is along
pluralistic lines that the solution must be sought.
Once the beneficiaries of the right to know have been identified, the
next problem concerns what specific rights should be guaranteed. The
answer has to be found in the values underlying our system of freedom
of expression and the function of the right to know concept. There
Vol. 1976: 1]
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should presumably be some fusion of the "is" and the "ought." The
precise interests and claims of the various groups involved would, of
course, be the dominating factor. But divergencies within the group
would not necessarily be resolved in favor of the lowest common
denominator. At some point, and to some extent, the pull of the ideal,
as the system of free expression is currently conceived, would also
become a factor.
Following these lines, the right to know would be construed to
include a right to broad and adequate information on a variety of sub-
jects. It would require opportunity to hear a multiplicity of opinions.
At least some of the material would not be bland but would provoke
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate." There would be a diver-
sity of programs. The requirements would be those of an active, alert,
and civilized society.
As radio and television broadcasting is presently structured, with
license to operate a station conferred broadly upon particular licensees,
the right to know seems to conflict with the right of station owners and
operators to communicate. Resolution of such conflict must turn upon
the capacity in which the licensee is functioning. In so far as he is
a trustee or agent for the general public, he is bound to follow govern-
ment regulations designed to protect the right to know. Here the prin-
ciples of the right to know prevail over the principles of the right to
communicate. But in so far as the licensee is entitled to speak for him-
self, as he would be part of the time, then his rights as communicator
are paramount and he must be accorded full protection against govern-
ment interference with his communications. Similarly, other users of
the broadcast station would be guaranteed full freedom of expression
in so far as they are communicators. The impact of protecting the right
to know thus falls only on the overall structure, not on the content of
particular broadcasts.
Translating these basic principles into more specific forms of regula-
tion, the right to know would clearly justify general programming
requirements imposed by the Federal Communications Commission, as
indeed was implied in the National Broadcasting case.12 It would also
validate the fairness doctrine, as was decided in the Red Lion case.
Moreover, the principles of the right to know would carry beyond this
point. They would justify a limited right of access to broadcasting
12. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
[Vol. 1976:1
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facilities, a form of regulation rejected by the FCC. The Supreme
Court upheld the FCC position in the Democratic National Commit-
tee case, but left open the issue whether a government regulation that
required access would be stricken. 3 As a matter of fact, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the right to know demands a common carrier
system of regulation in broadcasting. Only through such a structure
can the right to know be effectively achieved.
All of this may well be changed by the advent of cable television.
If the technical features of cable television eliminate the scarcity of
of physical facilities, so that use of this media is open to everyone who
can pay the cost, then the system would revert to an open and unregu-
lated one, like the printed press. Under such circumstances the right
to know would again become secondary to the right to communicate,
and the system of free expression would operate primarily through
protection of the rights of the communicator.
There are other applications of the right to know in this area which
can only be mentioned here. An important one is the right of recipi-
ents to participate in the decisionmaking process for allocation of scarce
facilities. Thus, procedural rights emanating from the right to know
have been recognized in cases awarding listeners the right to intervene
in FCC licensing proceedings. 14  Similar rights may be available to
recipients of other forms of communication. Apart from procedural
rights, the substantive principles of the right to know would also govern
in other contexts, such as permit systems for parades, demonstrations,
meetings, or other forms of public assembly. Allocation problems also
arise in connection with press coverage of fires and other emergencies,
and in situations involving curfews, press conferences, limited seating
capacity in courtrooms, and the like. So long as access is limited by
physical conditions, the allocation of scarce facilities must be governed
by principles derived from the concept of the right to know.
A second major area where the right to know has been invoked
concerns the right of access to means of communication other than
broadcasting, primarily to the printed press. The underlying problem
here, as already noted, is a critical one. The major instruments for
communication in this country are in the hands of a relatively small
13. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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group that uses them largely to expound a single economic, political,
and social point of view. The resulting distortion seriously undermines
the vitality and value of our system of freedom of expression.
One solution frequently advanced is that the law should provide for
a greater degree of access to the available means of communication by
compelling owners and operators to share their facilities with others
who wish to communicate. This position is usually urged in terms of
the right of the communicator to obtain access to the facilities. But
proponents of the right of access have also relied heavily upon the right
of the public to receive communications, that is, upon the right to
know.15 It is not entirely clear why the right to know should be
stressed more here than in other circumstances where it is equally
linked to the right of the speaker. Perhaps it is thought that control
of the means of communication has an even greater impact on the sys-
tem of free expression than suppression of individual speakers. Or
possibly, since affirmative government action is required to obtain
access, it is thought that a broader basis for justification than the right
of a single communicator is necessary. In any event the right to know
figures prominently in access cases.
One set of issues involves compulsory access to the privately-owned
printed press. Since no state action is ordinarily present in this situa-
tion, the self-executing features of the first amendment are not
applicable. Consequently, any right of access would be dependent
upon legislation. Proposals for such legislation have ranged from
affording a right of reply in defamation cases, to providing space
for answer by a political candidate who has been attacked, to making
mandatory the publication of paid advertisements, to a fairness doctrine
for the printed press, and beyond.
While the issues are not free of difficulty, my own view is that the
right to know does not provide adequate justification for measures of
this sort. It should be noted that the problem does not arise from a
shortage of physical facilities, as in the broadcasting situation, but
results primarily from economic inequalities. An effort by government
to eliminate differences based on economic disparities is an infinitely
more complex and far-reaching problem than an attempt to allocate
facilities in a shortage situation. The government does have some obli-
15. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAITv.
L. .Rnv. 1641 (1967).
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$ation to equalize, but limiting the rights of some speakers, instead of
raising disfavored speakers to a minimum level, invites disaster. A
share-the-facilities program on such a scale can only result in less com-
munication. And it involves a degree of governmental entanglement
with the system of expression that is certain to end in severe repres-
sion of communication. In this conflict between the right to know and
the right to communicate, the latter must be preferred. Such was the
position of the Supreme Court in the Tornillo case, and in my judgment
the Court was absolutely correct."
A second set of issues in the area of access relates to publicly-owned
means of communication. For many years the law has recognized a
right to use the streets, parks, and other open places for assembly and
communication. The right has been extended to some quasi-public
areas, such as company towns and shopping centers. Despite recent
limiting decisions by the Supreme Court, this right of access is firmly
fixed in our constitutional law. 17 On the other hand, a right of access
to publicly-owned media, such as government periodicals or public tele-
vision, remains much more doubtful.18  In either case, the right to
know has hitherto played only a supporting role. The issues have
turned almost exclusively upon an appraisal of the needs of the speaker
and his right of access to an audience. Greater utilization of right to
know- principles, however, would facilitate the solution to these
problems.
Finally, brief mention should be made of the use of the right to know
in a third area of governmental controls, that of disclosure laws. Legis-
lation of this sort seeks to compel those wishing to communicate to dis-
close various facts about themselves, such as identity, interests repre-
sented, source of funds, and the like. It includes not only general
requirements for the disclosure of authorship of publications or mem-
bership in associations, but also data relating to election campaign
16. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Su-
preme Court reached a similar conclusion in striking down the ceilings on campaign
expenditures incorporated in the Federal Election Campaign Act. Buckley v. Valeo,
96 S. Ct. 612, 649 (1976).
17. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939). Limiting decisions include Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. CL 1029 (1976);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972).
18. See Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
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financing and lobbying activities. The right to know is invoked as the
principal justification for these disclosure measures. There is no doubt
that disclosure laws do, in most instances, increase the amount of infor-
mation available upon which to judge the value of a communication.
On the other hand they often directly impair the freedom to communi-
cate. In my view, when this conflict occurs, the system of freedom of
expression is better served by protecting the right to communicate,
rather than the right to know. With the exception of campaign finance
and lobbying laws, the Supreme Court has tended to adopt this
position.19
Use of the Right to Know in Obtaining Information
From Governmental or Private Sources
The most potentially significant application of the right to know lies
in the area of obtaining information. Here legal doctrine can rely upon
and give effect to the central purpose of the right to know. While some
of the problems relate to the right to gather materials from private
sources, the main issues concern government secrecy and the right to
obtain information from government sources. This aspect of the
problem will be discussed first.
In my judgment the greatest contribution that could be made in this
whole realm of law would be explicit recognition by the courts that the
constitutional right to know embraces the right of the public to obtain
information from the government. There is a firm, indeed overwhelm-
ing, theoretical base for accepting this position. While I doubt that the
Meiklejohn theory is adequate as a foundation for the whole system.
of freedom of expression, in this area his theory is clear and convincing.
The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order
to instruct its servants, the government. As a general proposition, if
democracy is to work, there can be no holding back of information;
otherwise ultimate decisionmaking by the people, to whom that func-
tion is committed, becomes impossible. Whether or not such a guaran-
tee of the right to know is the sole purpose of the first amendment,
it is surely a main element of that provision and should be recognized
as such.
19. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612 (1954).
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A close analogy can be drawn here to the right of the legislative and
judicial branches of government to obtain information from the execu-
tive branch. In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court expressly
upheld the right of the judiciary to obtain data necessary to a grand
jury investigation from the President himself.20 Similarly, while there
is no Supreme Court confirmation as yet, the power of Congress to,
force the executive to produce materials necessary to the congressional
function cannot be doubted. These rights are subject, as the Court
ruled in the Nixon case, to a right of executive privilege, but the basic
constitutional right to information must be regarded as amply estab-
lished. If one conceives of the citizenry as constituting a fourth branch
of government, its right to information would flow from the same
premises. Indeed, as the dominant branch of government, the citizens
would possess rights superior to those of the other branches.
Moreover, the whole concept of government information as public
information has received increasing recognition in recent years. One
clear manifestation of this has been the growing number of federal and
state freedom of information laws, sunshine laws, and similar legisla-
tion. The experience of the nation with Watergate has spurred this
development. Clearly the country has come to accept the notion that
the ordinary citizen is entitled to access to government information.
This concept, so broadly based, is ready to be incorporated in constitu-
tional doctrine.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has given some hint that it is moving in
that direction. In its 1974 decisions in Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., the Court considered the validity of regulations
which prohibited journalists from interviewing prison inmates. A
majority of the Court rejected the contention that members of the press
have a first amendment right to interview any prisoner willing to talk
to them. But it was careful to point out that the regulations involved
did allow substantial access by the press and the public to the prisons
and that the purpose of the provision in question was not "to conceal
from the public the conditions prevailing in federal prisons." The clear
implication was that a total foreclosure of information about the inter-
nal operation of prisons would run afoul of the first amendment.
Moreover, a strong minority of four Justices made the position explicit.
Justice Powell pointed out that "First Amendment concerns encompass
20. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expres-
sion," and concluded that "the underlying right" is the "right of the
public to the information needed to assert ultimate control over the
political process ... ." Justice Douglas, in another dissenting opin-
ion, took the same view, contending that it was not the right of the
journalists that was involved "but rather the right of the people, the
true sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an
informed manner. '2
1
There is only one other case in which the Supreme Court has dealt
with a similar issue. In United States v. Richardson the Court held that
despite the provisions of article I, section 9 of the Constitution, requir-
ing "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money," a taxpayer and citizen has no standing to demand
information about the CIA budget.2 2  The case must be accounted
an unusual one, in view of the national security problems involved, and
of course the Court did not reach the merits. It is hard to believe that
government regulations which cut off all access to government informa-
tion, such as one that totally prohibited the press from talking to
government employees, would be sustained under the first amendment.
One would seem to be on solid ground, therefore, in asserting a
constitutional right in the public to obtain information from government
sources necessary or proper for the citizen to perform his function as
ultimate sovereign. Furthermore, this right would extend, as a starting
point, to all information in the possession of the government. It is hard
to conceive of any government information that would not be relevant
to the concerns of the citizen and taxpayer. Moreover, the right should
be enforced by giving all parties whose interests are at stake, namely
the citizen or taxpayer, standing to assert their rights in the courts.
Without delving into the intricacies of standing law at this point, and
despite the Richardson case, recognition of such a cause of action would
not take the courts much beyond the point they have already reached
in the Data Processing, Sierra Club, SCRAP, and similar cases.28
Starting from this initial point, some exceptions would have to be
formulated. In theory these exceptions should be scrupulously limited
21. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974). The quotations are at 417 U.S. 848, 863, 872, 839-40.
22. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
23. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
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to those that are absolutely essential to the effective operation of
government institutions. Many would exist only for a limited time. In
practice, if one approaches the problem with the view that government
information is public information, the exceptions would be confined to
a very narrow compass. It is impossible to consider these problems in
detail here. In general it may be said that some allowance would have
to be granted for sensitive national security data, but only to the extent
that tactical military movements, design of weapons, operation of
espionage or counterespionage, and similar matters are concerned.
Diplomatic negotiations and collective bargaining negotiations might
also need some protection, at least temporarily. Criminal investigations
and uncompleted litigation, and possibly also trade secrets, may fall into
the same category. Beyond this, the major areas in which withholding
of information would be justified would be those when it is necessary
to protect the right of executive officials to receive full and frank advice
from subordinates and colleagues-that is, executive privilege-and
those where the privacy of individuals is involved.
Establishment of this much of the constitutional right to know
through judicial procedures would, of course, be a long and tedious
process. Fortunately, a good start has already been made to achieve
the same end through legislation. The Federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act adopts much of the basic pattern just outlined. It commences
with a blanket requirement that every government agency presented
with a request for records "shall make the records promptly available
to any person." It then provides for nine exceptions, some of which
are excessively broad, but which cover much the same areas set forth
above. Equally important, the Act contains detailed provisions for
enforcing agency compliance, including judicial review. Some states
have passed similar legislation, and others have adopted sunshine laws
which provide for open meetings. Recognition of the right to obtain
information from the government has thus made substantial progress.
Acceptance of the constitutional right would provide a firm foundation
for further development and close important gaps in the legislative
structure.
Mention should be made of one other area in which the right to
obtain information, embodied in a constitutional right to know, becomes
important. This concerns the power of government to control the com-
munication of information by its employees and former employees, and
to control the dissemination of information that has leaked out of the
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government apparatus. Despite the Pentagon Papers case2" and the
Marchetti case,25 both constitutional and statutory law in this area
remain obscure. Conscientious adherence to right to know prin-
ciples would remove much of the uncertainty.
There can be no doubt of the power of the government to punish
espionage, in the narrow sense of conveying sensitive national defense
information to a foreign country with intent to injure the United States.
Nor does anyone question the authority of the government to adopt
security measures to safeguard that information which it is not obliged
to disclose, or to discipline its employees who reveal information in
violation of valid security regulations. Possibly the government may
also possess a very limited power to apply criminal sanctions to employ-
ees who violate security regulations, although I believe that as a matter
of policy such legislation should not be enacted. In addition the
ordinary sanctions against theft, trespass, burglary, and the like are, of
course, justified.
Beyond this point, however, the right to know would protect the
circulation of information which has escaped the government's grasp.
This constitutional protection is essential for two powerful reasons.
One is that the action of ,the press and other investigators in extracting
information from the government is a principal source of knowledge
about the inner workings, sometimes devious or corrupt, of the govern-
ment apparatus. Interference with this kind of information would
leave the citizenry exclusively dependent on the bland handouts of
government agencies. The second reason is that government efforts
to prevent the dissemination of information which has leaked into the
public domain would have a stifling impact upon all discussion or cir-
culation of information about public affairs. If the government could
extend its controls to specific pieces of information, under the claim
that they are official secrets, the system of freedom of expression would
be near collapse. As Watergate demonstrated once again, the expo-
sure of questionable or illegal government practices is so vital to the
operation of the democratic process that it should be protected not only
in terms of the right to communicate but also as a function of the right
to know. Indeed, here the right to know would extend protection sub-
24. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
25. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
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stantially beyond that which would be guaranteed by the right to
communicate alone.
The right to gather information from private sources raises several
questions which can only be briefly summarized here. The Constitu-
tion, of course, does not obligate any private person, that is, non-
government person, to disclose information to any other private person.
Indeed, a private person is protected against unwilling disclosures by
a variety of laws against trespass, theft, fraud, and other crimes and
torts. There has never been any suggestion that these laws infringe
the constitutional right to know.
The more important issues relate to the right to collect information
from sources willing to disclose it. Here two problems have come to
the fore. One is the right to travel as a means of informing oneself
of collecting information for publication. In Zemel v. Rusk, a State
Department regulation banning travel to Cuba was attacked, among
other reasons, on the ground that it infringed 'the right to know.26 The
Supreme Court, in a divided decision, upheld the regulation, treating
the conduct of travel as constituting action and hence outside the para-
meters of the first amendment. The dissenters expressly recognized
the relevance of the right to know and would have given that factor
sufficient weight to overcome the national security interests that the
State Department was asserting. Although the right to know is cer-
tainly an important element in this situation, the problem is better
treated as one involving freedom of movement, or the right to travel-
that is, as a liberty protected under the due process clause. The right
to know is not the main focus, and can influence the decision only as
one factor to be taken into account in striking a balance between the
interests in conflict.
The other major problem more directly concerns the right to know.
That is the right of journalists and other newsgatherers to keep their
source of information confidential against the demands of prosecuting
attorneys, grand juries, courts, legislative committees, or other govern-
ment officials. Without question the pledge of confidentiality, and the
capacity to honor it, are crucial to most investigative reporting. Whe-
ther it be an investigation of organized crime, the drug scene, a mili-
tant political organization, corruption or incompetence in government,
or any similar matter, much information vital to public decisionmaking
26. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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will not become available if reporters can be forced, often by powerful
and hostile officials, to reveal their informants, produce their notes, or
otherwise disclose details of their inquiry. Since the result of govern-
ment intervention is to dry up vital sources of information, the public's
right to know becomes a central issue.
There are, of course, important public interests arrayed on the other
side of the ledger. Hence the problem is a difficult one. In Branzburg
v. Hayes, decided in 1972, a majority of the Supreme Court held that
the reporter's right to gather news was entitled to some protection
under the first amendment, that the issue must be decided by a
balancing of interests, and that normally the interest of the public in
investigating and prosecuting crime would outweigh the reporter's right
to withhold his testimony.2  In my judgment the Court gave insuffi-
cient value to the right to know. Indeed, it treated the issue primarily
as one of the reporter's privilege, rather than of the right of the
citizenry to obtain hard-to-get information of immense social impor-
tance. Moreover, the Court's solution, while it apparently leaves open
the possibility that in individual cases a lower court could strike the
balance in favor of the reporter's privilege, in effect withholds virtually
all constitutional protection. Since the newsgatherer can seldom tell
in advance under what circumstances a court will allow him to keep
a pledge of confidence, he cannot rely upon any constitutional right in
deciding whether to make such a pledge. In that situation the right
to know is of little use to him, and investigative reporters must rely
upon the power and will of the press to resist encroachment.
Limitations on the Right to Know
Two general and important limitations on the constitutional right to
know must be noted. The first of these is the right of privacy, and
the second is the right not to know.
The clash between the right of privacy and the right to know is
obvious. One is almost the exact opposite of the other. Indeed, the
right of privacy has been defined by some as the right not to disclose
information about oneself to others, or the right to control the dissem-
ination of information about oneself.28 In my view that definition of
privacy is too narrow, but it does illustrate the head-on confrontation
27. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
28. See, e.g., A. WESTN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm 7 (1967).
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between the two important rights, each recognized as having constitu-
tional dimensions.
In the legal world, the conflict between the right of privacy and the
right to know takes a variety of forms. In one form the question is
whether the tort of invasion of privacy, either as recognized by common
law or established by statute, is consistent with the first amendment
right to communicate or to know. Or the conflict may appear as an
issue under the Freedom of Information Act or the Constitution as to
whether the government may withhold information from the public on
the grounds that disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy.
Again, the issue may be presented in terms of whether the first amend-
ment places any limits upon the sealing of arrest records or upon legis-
lation such as the Privacy Act of 1974. In whatever shape it appears,
the issue is bound to arise more frequently and to become more impor-
tant in the coming years.
There are several approaches available in seeking a reconciliation of
the two constitutional rights. One is by the process of ad hoc balancing.
Under this favorite constitutional formula, the interests in the public's
right to know would be weighed against the interests of the individual
in maintaining his privacy. While the courts are more disposed to
employ this method of reconciliation than any other, it has the usual
serious drawbacks of a balancing test. It is vague, amorphous, and
unpredictable, allowing a court to reach any conclusion that it wishes.
And it is difficult to apply because there is no common unit of
measurement to place upon the opposing sides of the scales. While
some element of balancing would probably be found in any test, the
balancing formula seems to offer the least useful path to follow.
A second alternative has been proposed by President Edward
Bloustein of Rutgers. Starting from the Meiklejohn theory that the
purpose of the first amendment is to guarantee citizens the information
and ideas they must have in order to govern, Bloustein suggests that
the line between the two constitutional rights be drawn in terms of the
need of the public to know. In so far as the communication is one that
is necessary or useful in this governing process, he argues, it should
be protected by the first amendment; otherwise, it may be prohibited
or curtailed as a violation of the right of privacy.29 The Bloustein for-
mula has many attractions. One need not accept the Melejohn theory
29. Bloustein, supra note 9.
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as the sole basis for protecting first amendment rights in order to adopt
Bloustein's doctrine as the rule for reconciling the two constitutional
rights involved here. Moreover, the formula is manageable and func-
tional. Yet it does have significant disadvantages. Most important is
that it acknowledges the right of the government to determine the value
of particular speech. This violates a cardinal principle of the system
of freedom of expression, that the government may not regulate expres-
sion on the basis of its content. It is not the prerogative of government
to decide whether any communication is good or bad, useful or danger-
ous, needed or not needed.
A third approach, and the one I favor, would give precedence, in
any conflict, to the right of privacy. -This formulation is based upon
the proposition that the constitutional right of privacy is intended to pro-
tect the autonomy of the individual by establishing a zone of privacy
within which the individual is protected against intrusion by any rule,
regulation, or practice of the society-in its collective capacity. The
demands of the first amendment, like those of any other rule of the col-
lective, would be subordinate to the'requirements of the privacy right.
Couched in these terms, the issue would then become one of defining
privacy, rather than balancing interests or ascertaining the need to
know. Such an approach suffers from the fact that no comprehensive
or accepted definition of privacy exists today. But it has the advantage
of avoiding balancing, eliminating the need for governmental judg-
ments about the content of expression, and focusing on the real issues.
A satisfactory understanding of the meaning of privacy must be
developed in the course of time.
However accomplished, the reconciliation of the right to know and
the right of privacy is crucial. These two constitutional concepts repre-
sent major developments in the progress of modem society. Somehow
they must be brought together, so that each can flourish in its own
sphere.
The second major limitation on the right to know presents less
difficult problems. The right not to know, akin to the right of privacy,
protects the individual against communications forced upon him against
his will. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized such a right.
For example, in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, the Court fully
accepted the proposition that the first amendment protected anyone
from being part of a captive audience, although in that case it did not
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uphold the claim that music and news-broadcasts in District of Columbia
buses infringed that right."0 The Court has several times indicated that
materials considered obscene could not be thrust upon an unwilling
listener or viewer." And in Rowan v. Post Office Department, the
Court upheld a federal statute providing that any person who mailed
material which the addressee in his sole discretion believed to be
"erotically arousing or sexually provocative" would be subject to an
order of the Postmaster General to refrain from further mailing of such
materials to the objecting addressee.32
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also recognized the first
amendment right both to seek out an audience and to be annoying, pro-
vocative, and offensive in public places. Thus in Martin v. City of
Struthers it struck down a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door
canvassing. 3 And in Cohen v. California it invalidated the conviction
of a young man who walked through the corridors of a courthouse with
the message "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned on the back of his shirt.3 4
Drawing these lines is not always easy. In general, however, the con-
flict is between the right not to know and the right to communicate,
rather than the right to know. On the whole, the right to know and
the right not to know readily exist together.
Conclusion
This then, in outline form, is the status of an emerging constitutional
right. The issues raised are typical of some of the frontier problems
of the first amendment. They deal not only with the negative force
of the first amendment in protecting against government interference
but also with the affirmative use of that constitutional guarantee in
expanding the whole system of freedom of expression. The old
doctrines remain important when one is considering the right of the
government to impose direct sanctions upon the right to read, listen,
or observe. But the role of the right to know in formulating govern-
30. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
31. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
32. Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
33. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
34. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
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ment controls to allocate scarce facilities, to provide mandatory access
to the means of communication, or to compel disclosure, calls for the
development of new doctrine. The use of the right to know in obtain-
ing information from government sources, its significance in analyzing
the extent of reporter's privilege, and the reconciliation of the right to
know with the right of privacy, all take us into uncharted fields. The
effort to formulate a comprehensive theory that will clarify and give
substance to the presently amorphous concept of the right to know pre-
sents a continuing challenge.
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